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Introduction 
 
  The Creative Commons (CC) (Creative Commons 2010) community offers an 
increasingly popular menu of licenses for copyrightable works. We present an economic 
analysis of the consequences of such licensing options to negotiations between Authors 
of works and Publishers who market and distribute the works. There exists scant previous 
work on the economics of CC, so we compare our results mainly to the literature on 
piracy and copying of works. CC licensing retains the connection between the Author and 
his work. The outcome is different from free distribution, shareware or piracy (Ramello 
2004, Hietanen 2008). The Author chooses attributes to his license in a way he finds 
optimal. Such licensing is considered to be helpful in getting new unknown artistic output 
to market (Lessig 2003). Like Open Source programming, the Creative Commons 
licensing has its roots in ideological movements. However it is a new instrument in the 
market for copyright works. It retains some of the Author’s rights but gives out the 
Publisher’s rights. With mere copyright there was no separation of benefits of Author and 
Publisher.  
 
We ask: When does the Author find it profitable to utilize a CC license for a portion of 
his work and what share does he CC license? How does the introduction of the CC 
licensing affect the negotiations between the Author and Publisher over the sharing of the 
profit from the copyright work? Does the introduction of the option to utilize CC 
licensing affect welfare? We consider a set-up where an Author creates a work, the 
Publisher distributes it and oversees the copyright. Consumers in turn decide whether to 
buy the work. Both the Author and Publisher receive revenue from the sales of the work 
under copyright. Importantly, the Author receives additional revenue from eg. live 
performances. Our key assumption is that the level of that revenue depends on the 
number of consumers that are aware of the Author’s works (have for example heard 
recordings etc.). From an economics point of view, the CC licenses seem interesting since 
they allow the Author to decide over the level of protection over portions of his works. 
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The Author may CC license a portion of his work and this may increase the number of 
consumers acquiring his work. The trade-off is that this portion cannot be sold through 
the Publisher as copyright work. Should the preferences of the Author and Publisher 
differ, it is the Author that determines the level of protection by CC licensing.        
 
We find that given the value of publicity and the distribution cost we find the optimal 
level of CC licensing. It is increasing in value of publicity, cost and decreasing in the 
share of copyright revenue to author. Without CC licenses, bargaining is straightforward. 
Author and Publisher gain monotonically in shares of the copyright revenue. If CC 
licenses are available, the negotiation setup changes. To the Author the bargaining 
remains similar. But to the Publisher, there is a dramatic change. He voluntarily concedes 
a share of the revenue to the Author. Either the Author’s share is such that the Author CC 
licenses a portion of his work and the Publisher, taking into account this, is willing to set 
the Author’s share optimally to maximize his profit from the copyright work. Or, if the 
profit from deterring the Author from CC licensing is higher, the Publisher gives the 
Author a share that makes it optimal for the author not to CC license at all.   The author 
may prefer CC licensing, for the publisher it is not desirable. The effect of CC licensing 
to bargaining does not have effect to an Author that is strong in bargaining, since his 
share is always larger than any of the concession points described. The CC licensing 
improves the position of weak Authors. If the Author and Publisher can agree on sharing 
the Author’s outside revenue too, they will do that. Given a bargaining outcome it is 
always possible to increase profits to both parties by setting another sharing rule that 
includes the outside revenue and optimizing the portion of work to be CC licensed. CC 
licensing may or may not increase welfare. The CC licensed portion of the work 
increases welfare. Some consumers that would not buy the copyright work, acquire the 
CC licensed work. Also the profit from a larger audience increases welfare. However, the 
surplus to the consumers with high willingness to pay decreases as the copyright work is 
now of lesser value. 
 
The Creative Commons licensing (Creative Commons 2010) was first established in 
2001. As a starting point, the founders used licensing agreements that are related to open 
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source software, for example Gnu GPL, General Public License. The CC licenses offer a 
menu of choices to the author. He can select a combination of Attribution, Share Alike, 
Noncommercial and No Derivative Works. Attribution means that you “let others copy, 
distribute, display, and perform your copyrighted work --- and derivative works based 
upon it --- but only if they give credit the way you request”. With Share Alike in turn 
“You allow others to distribute derivative works only under a license identical to the 
license that governs your work”. Noncommercial stipulates that “You let others copy, 
distribute, display, and perform your work --- and derivative works based upon it --- but 
for noncommercial purposes only”. And No Derivative Works in turn means that “You 
let others copy, distribute, display, and perform only verbatim copies of your work, not 
derivative works based upon it.” These items can be combined to best suit the authors 
needs for the protection and dissemination of the work, For example, “Attribution Non-
Commercial No Derivatives”. In the following analysis we do not distinguish between 
the combinations. It is sufficient to not that the licenses offer suitable combinations for a 
variety  of  unique  works.  For  us  the  key  property  is  that  the  cost  to  consumers  of  the  
licensed work cannot contain a rent from property rights. The Creative Commons 
movement has its background in mostly ideological aspirations. Lessig (2003) described 
the ways in which the standard copyright combined with present technologies, seemed to 
provide too much protection for works. According to the CC (creativecommons.org) 
website, more than 130 million works are already licensed using these agreements. There 
are large undertakings, such as, influential blogs, for example John Quiggin’s (Quiggin 
2010), and also commercial works, for example the financial tabloid Taloussanomat 
(Taloussanomat 2010). The license agreements are presently ported (translated and 
formatted to local legislation) to some 50 jurisdictions. 
  
The contractual relationships between Authors and Publishers were described by Caves 
(2003). He asserts the bilateral nature of such contracts and also that the contracts are 
signed well before actual sales. Towse (2006) further pointed out the weak position of the 
Authors in bargaining and the Authors rights to decide over their work even after 
contracting. Krueger (2005) and Connolly and Krueger (2006) have researched 
performance revenues of artists. They found that performance revenue is significant and 
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that it has grown faster that revenue from copyright works. Our approach has similarities 
with economic literature of piracy, illegal copying of works (for a survey, see Peitz and 
Waelbroek 2003). The CC licensed share of work has also a zero price and can be 
distributed freely. In piracy, the copier faces a cost of getting caught and Authors and 
possible Publishers lose revenue. With CC licensing the cost is lost revenue. The benefits 
of piracy accrue to the consumers (copiers) and, as in some models (Takayama 1994, 
1997), also to copyright holders, if there are network effects.  In the case of CC licensing, 
the Author and consumers benefit. The Author receives higher performance revenues and 
poor consumers can acquire a share of the work for free. Gayer and Shy (2006) 
considered piracy in a setting where an Author and a Publisher share the revenue from 
copyright works but where the Author receives all revenue from performances. They 
found that the Author may accept illegal copying since it enlarges the potential audience 
for performances. Our approach builds on this analysis. We, however, model the 
Author’s decision to optimal CC licensing and consider the consequences of such 
decisions to the bargaining between parties. CC licensing and sampling have similarities. 
Peitz and Waelbroek (2006) considered a scenario where a monopolist may allow partial 
free downloading (“sampling”) of works. The idea is that this increases the precision of 
consumers’ demand and thus benefits the monopolist. 
     
In the following we analyze the optimal CC decision of the Author and given that, the 
bargaining between the Author and Publisher. Joint decisions over CC and welfare issues 
are discussed.  
 
The model 
 
We present a model to analyze how the introduction of CC licensing affects the relations 
between the Publisher and Author of a work under copyright. The Publisher receives a 
share of 1 s?  and The Author a share of s of the profits from the sales of the Author’s 
copyright output. The Publisher’s objective is profit maximization from the sales of work 
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under copyright. The Author’s objective is to maximize profits from two sources. First, 
he receives a share of the copyright revenue and second, key to our model, he receives 
outside revenue from public appearances (see gayer shy concerts…). There is a market 
for the copyright work. The potential consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to 
pay for the work. They are indexed on real line by ? ?0,1x?  according to a linearly 
declining willingness to pay. Willingness to pay for the good is on the interval ? ?0,1 . We 
assume that there exists a unit cost  0c ?  for distributing the work. Let N to be the total 
number of consumers that are aware of the Author through buying or acquiring his work. 
We model the outside revenue to depend on the awareness linearly, o N? ?? . 
 
The timing in our model is the following. At stage 1, the Publisher and Author bargain 
over the revenue from the sales of the copyright output of the Author. At stage 2, if the 
CC licenses are available, the Author decides whether to and what share *k  of his work 
to license under the CC license. At stage 3, the remaining *1 k? copyright work is sold to 
consumers and if available, the consumers may acquire the output that is CC licensed. 
Consumers that are aware of the Author may attend occasions where he performs. 
Copyright revenues accrue to the Publisher and Author according to the bargaining 
outcome and the Author receives the outside revenue.  
 
3rd stage: selling the goods 
 
We solve the model by backward induction. Let us first assume that CC licensing is 
available and the Author CC licenses a share of his work, 0k ? . At the third stage, the 
price p  of the remaining copyright work 1 k? ,  the  price  of  the  CC  licensed  work,  
ccp c? and the share of CC licensed output k  are given. Consumers with a high 
willingness to pay buy the copyrighted work instead of acquiring the CC work. 
Consumers for whom the value of the CC licensed work exceeds the distribution cost c 
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acquire the CC work.  Consumers whose valuation of the CC work is less than the 
distribution cost c acquire nothing. The utility of consumer indexed x is accordingly1: 
 
? ?? ?
? ?
1 1
1
0
x
k x p c
U k x c
? ? ? ? ?
?? ? ??
?
?
   
 
We assume that the ratio of each consumer’s valuations for the copyright work and the 
work that is CC licensed is constant ? ?1 /k k? . The idea is that the consumers’ valuation 
is linear in the volume of the work. The Author’s total output is homogeneous and he 
offers some of it for free. Consumer j  is indifferent between acquiring the CC licensed 
work and acquiring nothing. He in turn determines the total number of consumers that 
acquire any work from the author and are thus aware of his existence, 
? ?1 0k j c? ? ? implying cc k cj N k
?? ? . Consumer i  is indifferent between buying the 
Copyright work for a given price p  and acquiring the CC licensed work for a distribution 
cost c, ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 1k i p c k i c? ? ? ? ? ? ? , implying ? ? ? ?1 2 1p k x? ? ? . The optimal sales 
*x  is found through profit maximization given the share k . Maximization of profits,  
? ? ? ?max 1 2 1 2cc k i c i? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? , yields * 12i ? , 
* (1 2 )
2
kp ?? .  The  profits  from  the  
copyright work are 1 2
4cc
k? ?? 2. 
 
If the CC license is not available to the Author, we assume that he will not release any 
share of his work free. We motivate this assumption is that without the license contract 
                                                  
1 We assume that the CC licensed work is not included in the distribution media of the copyright work. 
Furthermore, we assume that a consumer either acquires the CC licensed share or buys the remaining 
copyright work. An alternative specification is that also those consumers that buy the copyright work 
acquire the CC licensed share of work. See appendix. 
 
2 The same expression of  profits obtains when consumers must exert an effort with cost c to acquire either 
good.  
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anyone can present the work as his own and the Author cannot benefit from increased 
awareness. This analysis covers also the situation where the CC license is available but 
the Author decides not to release any material under the CC license, ie. k=0. The utility 
of consumer indexed x when buying or not is:   
 
1
0x
x p c
U
? ? ??? ?
?
 
 
Let consumer x  to be indifferent between buying the Copyright work and acquiring 
nothing. Consumer x  determines the quantity of copyright work sales given the price p  
and the total number of consumers that acquire any work from the author. 
? ?max 1cr x c x? ? ? ? , yielding * 1 2
cx ?? . Thus copyright profits are ? ?
21
4cr
c? ??  and 
the number of consumers aware of the Author is * 1
2cr
cx N ?? ? . 
 
Besides the revenue from output the author receives revenue from other sources. This 
revenue depends on publicity based on the awareness of the consumers. We model it to 
depend linearly on the number of consumers that acquire any of the work. Let the 
marginal revenue of this income be ? . The author’s revenue from other sources is 
o N? ??  
 
The author’s and Publisher’s total revenues with CC licensing  
? ? 1 2, ,
4Acc o cc
k c ks c k s s
k
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?                                                                    (1a) 
? ? ? ? ? ?1 2, 1 1
4Pcc cc
ks k s s? ? ?? ? ? ?                                                                              (1b) 
 
And in the case of no CC licensing 
? ? ? ?
211,
2 4Acr o cr
ccs c s s? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ?                                                                       (2a) 
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
21
, 1 1
4Pcr cr
c
s c s s? ? ?? ? ? ?                                                                             (2b) 
 
 
 
2nd stage: The choice of utilizing the CC license  
 
Let us consider the Author’s optimal choice of the share of his output that he CC licenses, 
*k . Given Author’s share s , the outcome of the bargaining over the copyright profits, the 
Author faces a trade-off in (1a). A large k  increases awareness but decreases copyright 
profits. The author’s profit maximization of (1a) yields the following FOC: 
 
2 02
Accd c s
dk k
? ?? ? ? 3  
Thus the optimal CC license share is * 1 2min ,
2
ck
s
?? ?? ?? ? ?
? ?
. 
 
RESULT 1: The optimal share of work to CC license is increasing in the value of 
publicity,  ?  and in distribution cost c  but decreasing in the Author’s share of the 
copyright revenue, s . 
 
If the Author’s profit is greater under CC licensing than without it, given the result of the 
bargaining s , ? ?? ? ? ?*,Acc Acrs k s s? ?? , the author CC licenses *k  portion of his work. 
The condition for this is 
? ? ? ?2**
*
1 2 11
4 2 4
k ck c cs s
k
? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? , yielding 
                                                  
3 SOC: 3
2 0c
k
?? ?  
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? ? ? ?? ?
*
* 2 *
2 2 4
,
2 2cr
k c c
s s c
k c c k
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
.  If   crs s? , the Author finds it more profitable to 
copyright all his output and thus set * 0k ? , even if CC is available. 
 
 
If the Author does not CC license ( * 0k ? ), the copyright work has a quantity of  1
2
c? . 
For the CC licensing to increase awareness, we require that
*
*
1
2
k c c
k
? ?? , implying 
* 2
1
k c
c
? ? . So if ? ?
2
1 1s s cc
?? ? ?  ,  some consumers beside the buyers of the copyright 
work acquire the CC licensed work. If this does not hold, it is more profitable for the 
Author not to CC license, since it does not increase N and lowers revenue from sales. 
From the condition * 1
2
k ?  we find that if 8ks s c?? ? , it is optimal for the Author to CC 
license the whole work, * 1k ? , and receive revenue only from sources based on 
awareness.  Note that for * 1k ? , the Author’s profit is ? ?1Acc c? ?? ? . 
 
Thus, given s , low value of performance ?  relative to cost c implies that the optimal CC 
licensing cannot increase the number of consumers aware of the Author. In contrast, a 
large ?  implies that it is optimal to rely only on revenue that is based on awareness. For 
a small distribution cost, c , a small share of CC licensing is optimal.  
 
1st stage: contract negotiation 
 
At the first stage the Publisher and the Author bargain over the division of the profits 
from the copyright work. If the CC license is not available, the analysis is 
straightforward. The Author’s profit is monotonically increasing in s  and the Publisher’s 
profit decreases monotonically in s . It is in the Publisher’s interest to give as low a share 
of the profits to the Author, s , as possible. If CC licensing is available, three outcomes 
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are possible. If ks s? , the Author CC licenses all of his output and receives a profit of 
? ?1 c? ? . If k crs s s? ? , the Author CC licenses the share *k  of his output. If crs s? , the 
Author abstains from CC licensing. These thresholds change the Publisher’s incentives in 
the bargaining compared to no CC licensing. 
 
Either through bargaining or by the Publisher’s choice, we may have crs s? , and the 
author CC licenses his output. The Publisher’s optimal bargaining outcome is *s , which 
maximizes the Publisher’s profit under CC licensing. 
 
 
? ?
21
max 1
4Pcc
c
ss
?
?
?
? ?     
 
The first order condition reads 
3 1
2 21 1 12 2 0
8 4 8
cs cs? ?? ?? ? ? 4. Solving the 
maximization problem yields  * ( , )s c? , which is the solution to 
3 1
2 2 4
2
s s
c?
? ?? ? . 
 
Previously we found that by allowing the Author a share  crs s? , the Publisher deters the 
CC licensing, since now it is profitable for the Author not to CC license. The Publisher’s 
profit is decreasing in s  when there is no CC licensing. His profit is maximized for 
crs s? , as CC is just deterred. The publisher concedes either to ? ?,crs c ?  or to ? ?* ,s c ? , 
whichever provides larger profit. In both cases they are the ‘threat points’ of the 
Publisher. We can show that * crs s?  holds always. Comparative statics reveal that 
0Pccd
dc
? ?  and 0Pccd
d
?
? ? , as can be expected. Increased costs and stronger threat from 
the performance revenue to the Author decrease the Publisher’s profits. The optimal 
                                                  
4 SOC: 
5 3
2 23 12 2 0
16 16
cs cs? ?? ?? ? ?  
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bargaining outcome becomes worse for the Publisher as performance revenue to the 
Author increases, 
*( , ) 0ds c
d
?
? ?  and as costs increase, 
*( , ) 0ds c
dc
? ? . The Publisher must 
compensate in bargaining for the Author’s increased willingness to CC license his work.  
 
Consider examples in figures 1, 2, 3. In Figure 1, when the value of publicity is high 
( 0,45? ? )  it  is  profitable  to  the   Publisher  to  allow  CC  licensing  and  target  the  
bargaining to share *1 s? , in figure 2, the Publisher is indifferent between *1 s?  and 
1 crs? ( but the Author would naturally prefer crs  to *s ). In Figure 3, for a low value of 
publicity ( 0,3? ? ), the Publisher’s profit is maximized when he deters CC licensing by 
targeting to 1 crs?  in bargaining.   
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The Publisher is indifferent between ? ?,crs c ?  and ? ?* ,s c ?  when 
? ?? ? ? ?? ?*, ,Pcr cr Pccs c s c? ? ? ?? , like in figure 2 .Thus for a given marginal value of 
publicity, ? ,  we can find the critical value of distribution cost  ? ?cr ccc ??  for which the 
equality holds. If the distribution cost is below this value, ? ?cr ccc c ??? , the Publisher 
accommodates CC licensing and targets in bargaining to exactly *1 s?  share of the 
revenue from the copyright output. If ? ?cr ccc c ??? , the Publisher deters CC licensing and 
targets to the highest share of revenue,  for which the Author does not CC license his 
output, 1 crs? . In Figure 4, combinations of ?  and c  to the left of the line lead the 
Publisher to allow CC licensing and target to *s , and to the right of the line he will deter 
CC licensing by allowing the smallest share to the Author that accomplishes that, crs .  
 
 
  
  
For the Publisher, the set-up is quite different from the situation with no CC licensing 
available. His profits depend still directly from the result of bargaining, 1 s? ,  but  also  
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from the indirect effect of bargaining to the level of CC licensing, ? ?*k s , and to the 
choice of the Author whether to CC license or not. The Author wants as large a share as 
possible since his profit is always non-decreasing in the share, 0Accd
ds
? ? . The Publisher 
instead voluntarily gives a share of copyright profits to the Author. The limit to this 
voluntary capitulation is either crs or 
*s . 
 
RESULT 2: Under CC licensing the Publisher voluntarily gives a share of copyright 
profits to the Author. The limit to this voluntary capitulation is for low distribution 
cost the optimal share under CC, *s , and for high distribution cost the share that 
deters CC, crs . 
 
Based on the previous, we can ask: when does the introduction of CC licensing have an 
impact to the relations between the Publisher and Author? First of all, it is evident that if, 
given ,c? , the Author has a strong position in the bargaining in the absence of CC, 
crs s? , the appearance of CC licensing does not alter profit sharing. So only if potentially 
the share s  is small, the Publisher recognizes the threat of CC license and reneges in the 
bargaining. The potential new audience that CC licensing can provide depends strongly 
on the level of the distribution cost, c . In the extreme, for 0c ? , even CC licensing a 
very small share of output disseminates awareness of the Author to all consumers. The 
implication is that the existence of CC licensing acts as threat to the Publisher who is hurt 
from its use - the author loses copyright revenue but gains revenue from performances. 
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The Author and the Publisher contract to share all 
revenue  
 
Let us compare the previous set-up where the Author determines the share *k   that he 
will CC license to a situation where the Author and the Publisher bargain over total 
revenue, both from copyright and performances. As a first step we ask: given a 
bargaining outcome As  when the Author determines CC licensing, is there a contract APs  
over total revenue that is preferred by both parties? The level of CC licensing that 
maximizes total profits, 1 2
4coll Acc Pcc
k c k
k
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? , is * 1min , 2
2coll
k c?? ?? ? ?? ?
. 
 
Under the Author’s rule, CC licensing occurs when A crs s? . Then contracting over total 
revenue is preferred if  
 
? ? ? ?
21 2
2 1 2 21 1
4 42
A
Pcc A Pcoll AP
c
s c c cs s
c
?
? ?? ? ?
?
? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
 and 
2 21 2
2 1 2 2
4 42 2
A A
Acc A Acoll AP
A
c cc
s s c c cs s
c c
s
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
. 
 
If A crs s? , the  Author does not CC license. Then the conditions for preferring 
contracting over total revenue read  
 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?
21 2 1 2 21 1
4 42Pcr A Pcoll AP
c c c cs s
c
? ?? ? ?
?
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
 and 
? ?211 2 1 2 2
2 4 42Acr A Acoll AP
cc c c cs s
c
? ?? ? ? ?
?
? ??? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
. 
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RESULT 3: If contracting over joint total revenue is possible, both the Author and 
the Publisher will do so. An Author that is weak in bargaining is more motivated to 
contract over total revenue.  
 
For A crs s? , if ? ? ? ? ? ? *( )totcc A Acc A Pcc A Acoll Pcoll coll colls s s k? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  contracting 
over total revenue is profitable since there is surplus to be divided between the author and 
Publisher. APs  can then be set in a fashion that satisfies both conditions above. We see 
immediately that the above condition holds always since *( )coll collk?  is the maximal profit 
from the market. We can ask: is collusion more likely when the Author’s bargaining 
power is small or when it is moderate, yet so small that the Author CC decides to license 
( A crs s? )? Differentiation yields 
1 3
2 2
1 1
( ) 1 3 0
2 8
Acc Pcc
A
d cs s
ds
? ? ?
?
? ?? ? ? ?  and we know 
that joint profit *( )coll collk? is constant in bargaining outcome. Thus contracting over total 
revenue is more likely if the Author is weak in bargaining. 
 
Second, for A crs s? , if *( )Acr Pcr Acoll Pcoll coll collk? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  holds always for the same 
reason as above. Contracting over joint revenue is profitable regardless of the bargaining 
outcome and the motivation for contracting over joint revenue is independent of the 
bargaining outcome, As .   
 
Welfare aspects  
 
 
The total surplus from profits and consumer surplus (excluding possible consumer 
surplus from performances) is in the absence of CC licensing 
 
? ? ? ?3 1 1
8 2cr
c c cW ?? ? ?? ? . 
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With CC licensing total surplus reads 
 
? ? ? ?23 1 4 2
8 4cc
k c k c k cW
k k
?? ? ? ?? ? ? . 
 
The welfare maximizing level of CC licensing is found by setting the FOC to zero, 
2
2 2
1
8
ccdW c c
dk k k
?? ? ? ? =05. In the following we assume that c? ? . The optimal level of 
CC licensing is ? ?* 2 2Wcck c c?? ? .  
 
As a first step we consider welfare issues in light of an example (figures 5, 6). The social 
planner’s optimal level of CC licensing is for low distribution costs lower (for high costs 
higher) than the level that the Author chooses given the bargaining outcome that is 
optimal for the Publisher (figure 5). The intuition is that because increasing publicity is 
cheap for low costs, the loss to wealthy consumers has high weight. In figure 6 we see 
that that interestingly the Publisher’s decision to allow or deter CC licensing matches 
approximately the preferences of the social planner. Point ( )cr ccc ??  (from figure 4) 
shows the level of distribution cost above which the Publisher would deter CC licensing. 
The level of welfare is close to the planner’s choice in the market solution.  
 
 
 
    
 
                                                  
5 The SOC reads  
2 2
2 3 3( 2)( )
ccd W c c
dk k k
?? ? ? ? . It negative provided that c? ? . 
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Conclusions 
 
Our analysis predicts that Authors who are weak in bargaining are more likely to CC 
license some of their work. The share increases in the distribution cost and the value of 
publicity and decreases in the Author’s share of revenue. The Publisher’s reaction to the 
possibility of a weak Author’s CC licensing is either to accommodate it and yield a share 
of revenue that maximizes his revenue or yield a share that deters the Author from CC 
licensing. In either case the author benefits. The welfare effects of CC licensing are 
ambiguous. It increases surplus with poor consumers and the Author and reduces the 
Publisher’s profits. 
 
Appendix 
All consumers acquire the CC licensed work 
 
An alternative specification for the market interaction is that consumers for whom the 
value of the CC licensed work exceeds the distribution cost c acquire the CC work.  
Consumers with a high willingness to pay buy the copyrighted work and acquire the CC 
work. Finally consumers whose valuation of the CC work is less than the distribution cost 
c acquire nothing. We assume that the ratio of each consumer’s valuations for the 
copyright work and the work that is CC licensed is constant ? ?1 /k k? . The idea is that 
the consumers’ valuation is linear in the volume of the work. The Author’s total output is 
homogeneous and he offers some of it for free. Consumer j  is indifferent between 
acquiring the CC licensed work and acquiring nothing. He in turn determines the total 
number of consumers that acquire any work from the author and are thus aware of his 
existence, ? ?1 0k j c? ? ? implying cc k cj N k
?? ? . 
 
In addition to acquiring the CC licensed work at a cost c , consumer i  buys the copyright 
work if for a given price p , ? ? ? ?1 1 2 0k x p c? ? ? ? ? , implying ? ?? ?1 1 2p k x c? ? ? ? . 
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The optimal sales *x  is found through profit maximization given the share k . 
Maximization of profits, ? ? ? ?max 1 1 2cc k x c x? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? , yields * (1 ) 22(1 )
k cx
k
? ?? ? , 
* (1 ) 2
2
k cp ? ?? . The profits from the copyright work are ? ?? ?
2
1 2
4 1cc
k c
k
?
? ?? ?? ?? ?
6. 
 
The author’s and Publisher’s total revenues with CC licensing are then  
 
? ? ? ?? ?
2
1 2
, ,
4 1Acc o cc
k ck cs c k s s
k k
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?
    (1) 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
2
1 2
, 1 1
4 1Pcc cc
k c
s k s s
k
? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?
 
 
In the paper we utilize the specification that a consumer acquires either the copyright 
work or the CC licensed work. Initial analysis shows that qualitative results are similar 
except for welfare analysis. It is my intention to include this specification in future to the 
welfare section.  
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